いま最も注目される気鋭の哲学者、待望の初対談集。第一線で活躍する論客たちと、哲学、文学、社会、精神医学、サブカルチャーなどを横断し、現代の問題を縦横無尽に語りつくす。思考の前衛がここにある!

Austin introduces the idea of securing the uptake in the context of dealing with the illocution-perlocution distinction. In recent times, the notion is employed by some neoaustinian scholars to argue that the uptake is what triggers the deontic effects (rights, duties, obligations, permissions, etc.) associated to an illocution. Here, a distinction is made between two kinds of uptake: uptake-as-understanding and uptake-asaccepting, and the stance that the second is the one needed for a plausible theory of speech action inspired by Austin’s (...) original ideas is defended. When that notion is adopted, some old problems about speech action can be clarified. (shrink)

Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

L’expression « phénoménologie de la vie » indique une visée commune entre les pensées de Michel Henry et de Bin Kimura. La « phénoménologie historique », telle que conçue par Husserl, trouve l’essence des phénomènes dans le mode d’apparaître des objets par la médiation de la différenciation temporelle. La phénoménologie de la vie saisit cette essence dans une dimension verticale, appelée « immédiateté » par Kimura, qui unit le présent caractéristique de l’être du soi avec la Vie absolue. Elle situe (...) ainsi le fondement de la temporalité dans la genèse spontanée du présent à partir de la Vie absolue. On examine d’abord ici la particularité des phénomènes (soi, monde et autrui) dans l’expérience de l’immédiateté du point de vue de la phénoménologie de la vie, puis on montre que Kimura voit dans la Vie absolue non seulement le principe de la vie, mais aussi celui de la mort. (shrink)

Nous pouvons distinguer chez Michel Henry « phénoménologie de la vie » et « phénoménologie de la culture » comme étant opposées à la « phénoménologie de la nature ». Avant d’être objective et naturelle, la réalité est toujours vitale et pathétique, et son apparaître sous la forme d’une culture est son mode d’être originel. Par conséquent, la « phénoménologie de la vie », phénoménologie qui, en comprenant ainsi la réalité, cherche dans la vie le fondement de cette réalité toujours (...) apparaissant en tant qu’originairement culturelle, devrait être entendue comme « phénoménologie de la culture ». Dans cette perspective, nous prendrons ici la phénoménologie henryenne comme « phénoménologie de la culture » et on tentera de savoir comment elle comprend la naissance de la culture à partir de la vie, autrement dit, comment elle conçoit la naissance de la culture qui ne fait qu’une avec l’auto-engendrement de la vie. (shrink)

A finales de septiembre de 2019, se publica Folie, langage, littèrature que se suma a la anterior colección de textos inéditos de Foucault en torno a la literatura que en 2013 aparecía bajo el título de La gran extranjera. Este nuevo volumen presenta textos inéditos donde los editores, nos dice Judith Revel, han seleccionado textos que vienen a incomodar la lectura canónica del Foucault interesado por la literatura. Y, efectivamente, la selección es especialmente interesante para los estudiosos de su obra (...) porque sitúa su ruptura con un concepto escapista de la literatura en torno a 1967. Particularmente llamativo es el texto «L’extralinguistique et la littérature», donde Foucault propone un análisis de los distintos modos en que lo extralingüístico, como afuera de la obra, se relaciona con ella y viceversa. A partir de esta propuesta, nuestro objetivo es analizar una política de la forma literaria que en Foucault se propone desde una materialidad negativa, a la vez que performativa. (shrink)

An introduction by Veronica Rodriques-Blanco to A Symposium on the Nature of Legal and Political Authority.

In this paper I propose to conceive of forgiveness as a process of eliminating punitive reactive attitudes, which makes up part of the offended person’s willingness to reestablish a certain type of reciprocal relationship with the offender. Distinguishing among types of reciprocity allows us to realize that forgiveness is a more varied phenomenon than is usually assumed in the philosophical literature, as well as to understand why the dispute concerning the gratuitousnessconditionality of forgiveness is meaningless.

Utterances of explicit performatives, such as “I order you to close the door,” have the forces named by the appearing verbs; here, the utterance has the force of ordering. These utterances utilize declarative sentences, which usually indicate the force of statements, rather than of any verbs contained in them. This leads many to theorize that explicit performatives are statements that cause their hearers to infer the forces they name. This article argues against this account on the grounds that it is (...) based on the false premise that hearers can unconsciously recognize illocutionary forces. Instead, I put forward the account that explicit performatives are nothing but the acts with the forces that they name. (shrink)

En este trabajo se ofrece un acercamiento desde el derecho a los análisis promovidos por las teorías institucionalistas, y conecta esos análisis con una concepción esencial de democracia y dos problemas de las democracias latinoamericanas: la subrepresentación de las mujeres en los parlamentos y el clientelismo político en el marco de la distribución de planes sociales. Para ello, se comienza con una aproximación al concepto de instituciones informales, que es central en los análisis institucionalistas, y se reconocen dos diferentes tipos (...) de instituciones informales con distintas características. Luego de ofrecida una concepción esencial de democracia y sus condiciones y condicionantes, se realiza un análisis de cómo las instituciones informales han afectado la eficacia y efectividad de las normas jurídicas dictadas para promover las cuotas de género en las elecciones parlamentarias y, como contracara, se muestra cómo un diseño adecuado de los programas de distribución de planes sociales ha logrado neutralizar instituciones informales tales como el clientelismo y la pequeña corrupción, que afectaban de manera directa a las democracias latinoamericanas. Finalmente se proponen ciertas ideas sobre la relevancia del buen diseño legislativo y su vinculación con las instituciones informales. (shrink)

RESUMENEn este artículo se ponen de manifiesto algunos aspectos de la ética pontiana. El núcleo gira en torno al sujeto como ente relacional. Este aparece inmerso en una praxis intersubjetiva que impregna el obrar humano en conexion incesante con el mundo, físico, cultural y socialPALABRAS CLAVEMERLEAU-PONTY-ETICA-FENOMENOLOGIAABSTRACTThe paper focuses on Merleau-Ponty's ethics. it deals with the subject as a relational being. According to Merleau Ponty, the subject appears immersed within the intersubjective praxis of human action in the world, physical, cultural and (...) socia.KEYWORDSMERLEAU-PONTY-ETHICS-PHENOMENOLOGY. (shrink)

This paper compares two philosophical views from vastly different intellectual traditions: the views typical of neo-Aristotelian naturalism and the views that Kitarō Nishida describes in his An Inquiry into the Good. I concentrate on the following points. Nishida and neo-Aristotelian naturalists share the view that the mind tends to construct experience as it characterizes phenomena. It evaluates those that fulfill this tendency positively and those that fail to fulfill it negatively. Moral judgment is one manifestation of this tendency. This allows (...) both approaches to claim that the natural goodness/defect that characterizes human beings results from the capacity of rational choice, and that normalcy in developing and exercising this capacity provides criteria for evaluating the moral status of individuals. Nevertheless, they diverge on whether or not the application of these criteria is agent-neutral or agent-relative. Based on these considerations, I argue that Nishida’s view is free from a major difficulty that the neo-Aristotelian naturalist encounters. (shrink)

This paper examines assumptions concerning the relationship between citizenship, justice, and well-being, based on representative political philosophies, including egoism, utilitarianism, libertarianism, liberalism, and communitarianism. A previous paper raised the possibility of an inter-disciplinary framework for collaboration between psychology and political philosophy. This study picks up that thread and attempts to actualize a collaborative research effort based on a framework grounded in positive political psychology. The first part of this study reflects on the methodology situated between empirical psychology and philosophy in (...) reference to the debates caused by psychological and philosophical situationism. In response to its criticism against virtue ethics, the possibility of reconstructing it on empirical psychology has paradoxically emerged. Similarly, this study validates assumptions on political philosophies employing the psychological method concerning well-being. Accordingly, the central part examines the plausibility of the assumptions by empirical evidence obtained from two internet surveys in Japan. The relationships between citizenship, justice, and well-being are the most substantial in the communitarian assumption. The exploratory factor analysis of the two surveys illuminates that the correlations between citizenship, justice, and well-being are substantial. This relationship denies the egoism assumption. Moreover, almost all correlations between the three are higher based on virtue-related indicators than hedonic ones. These findings are not in tune with the utilitarian assumption and are most congruent to the communitarian assumption. In addition, citizenship and justice correlate more with political well-being than overall well-being. As these are more directly associated with political well-being in the communitarian assumption, this result aligns with the assumption. Furthermore, the positive relationship between disparity elimination and well-being fits the liberal rather than the libertarian assumption. Nevertheless, the substantial correlation between ethical justice and well-being is higher by virtue-related indicators than hedonic indicators, suggesting distributive justice is associated with the ethical dimension. Again, this fits the communitarian assumption rather than the liberal assumption. Thus, philosophical psychology empirically verifies the interdependence of the three conceptions and the relative plausibility of the communitarian assumption. Moreover, as the relationship between the three is essential for political philosophies, the result increases the reliability of communitarianism. (shrink)

This paper analyses and criticizes Joseph Raz's attacks on coherentist theories. It is argued that Raz's characterisation of epistemic coherence theories is too narrow and that his criticism of constitutive coherence theories is based on a conceptual mistake in his own description. The study is an indirect argument to rethink coherence theories of law and adjudication within a more powerful framework than that propounded by Raz.

Judges and lawyers believe that international law, customary law, and legal systems such as the Third Reich or apartheid law in South Africa are law. But how do we explain the fact that there is one concept of law when there are different conceptions of law with a variety of different features? Finnis, inspired by the Aristotelian notion of central case, adumbrates the idea that the concept of law might be unified by a primary concept which is the concept of (...) “law as practical reason”; that is, law conceived from an ethical perspective. He advances two arguments to defend his methodology: the conceptual and the functional. Contra Finnis, the paper shows that neither the conceptual nor the functional argument can successfully support the view that “law as practical reason” is the central case of the concept of law. The study clarifies the Aristotelian notion of central case and illustrates the mistaken application of this notion to the concept of law. However, we also argue that Finnis's insight–the idea that all the different conceptions of law might be unified for the purposes of theoretical research–is fundamental and appealing. This paper aims to reconstruct Finnis's insight through the model of core resemblance. The result is that the different conceptions of law can be unified by resemblance to the concept of “law as practical reason,” though there is no identity among the different conceptions of law. (shrink)

In the past decades, with the decline of the Grand Narratives and the subsequent need for new historical and political orientation, literary studies have been reflecting on the role of literature in the world. Together with Jacques Rancière—and in dialogue with Althusser, Foucault, or Fischer-Lichte—the present volume analyzes this political turn of literary studies.

En el presente trabajo esbozaremos una reflexión crítica en torno a una cuestión que fue determinante en el devenir trágico de Europa durante las primeras décadas del siglo xx. Nos referimos al nefasto papel que cumplieron determinadas filosofías, vitalistas y neorrománticas, en la gestación de los terribles acontecimientos históricos que todos conocemos. Analizaremos cómo se consolidó, en ciertos universos intelectuales, todo un conjunto de ideas que tenían que ver con la idealización de una vida peligrosa y combativa, con la mistificación (...) del guerrero, con la romantización de la violencia e incluso con la poetización de la guerra. (shrink)

Kelsen advanced a sophisticated naturalist conception of intention and adumbrated a methodological strategy that would enable the transformation of the sophisticated naturalist conception of ‘intention’ into a cognizable object of legal science while simultaneously providing an explanation of the legal ‘ought’. The methodological strategy is the ‘inversion thesis’ which establishes that legal norms enable us to objectively identify and determine the ‘will’ or the intention of legal authority. Contrary to nineteenth century psychologism, Kelsen argues that it is not the case (...) that the will or the intention of the sovereign determines what the norm is, rather it is the legal ought that ‘objectifies’ the will. However, it is argued that in spite of the fact that Kelsen advanced a sophisticated account of intentional action, he fails to understand the complexities of the notion of the ‘will’, intentional action and practical reason. What does he miss in his understanding of the notion of the practical? I will advance the view that the notion of the practical or deliberative involves, both in Kant and Aristotle, the transparency condition which establishes that the agent or deliberator intentionally acts for reasons that are self-evident or transparent to him or her. It is a recalcitrant feature of the deliberative standpoint that cannot be theorised. For Aristotle, Aquinas and Anscombe the deliberative standpoint can be known through the end or goal of the intentional action as this provides the form of the action. The end is presented as a good-making characteristic. As problematic as that might be, this means that the end needs to be presented as a good-making characteristic and therefore it involves evaluation. For Kelsen, the soundness of this conception is an insurmountable obstacle to theorise the ‘ought’ and therefore the ‘will’. Yet, surprisingly and contrary to Kelsen’s own notions, I will show that Kelsen’s ‘inversion thesis’ is parasitic on Aristotle–Anscombe’s ‘ought’. (shrink)

Exploramos las actitudes de los españoles hacia las herramientas digitales propuestas por los actores políticos durante las elecciones generales españolas de 2008. Analizamos seis grupos de discusión organizados según las dimensiones de edad, identificación ideológica y nivel de institucionalización a la hora de participar en política. Exploramos hasta qué punto la brecha digital generacional de los usuarios de Internet, la auto-ubicación ideológica o la pertenencia a partidos políticos y movimientos sociales influye en la percepción de la ciberpolítica. Los resultados son (...) complejos. La ciudadanía percibió como la igualdad de las prácticas digitales no se correspondía con las potencialidades de una ciberdemocracia distorsionada. (shrink)

Este trabajo tematiza el contraste entre la Novela Histórica Tradicional y la Nueva Novela Histórica en el contexto colombiano de la segunda mitad del siglo XX en cuanto a la representación del pasado nacional y, en particular, en cuanto al lugar del Otro en el tiempo/espacio de ese pasado. Se postula que los escritores colombianos de la Nueva Novela Histórica, al tematizar la presencia del Otro culturalmente diferente al sujeto de la élite republicana, son un antecedente cultural de la Constitución (...) política del 91, que reconoce la calidad pluricultural de la nación colombiana. This paper analyses the contrast between the Traditional Historical Novel and the New Historical Novel in the Colombian context of the second half of the XX century with reference to the representation of the national past and specifically referring to the estimation of the other as far as time and space in the past is concerned. i will argue that Colombian writers of the New Historical Novel mark the presence of the Other, who is culturally different from the republican elite, the main subject, and thus these works become the cultural background of the Political Constitution of 1991, that recognizes the multicultural situation of the Colombian nation. (shrink)

Dworkin advances the view that judges decide legal cases according to constructive interpretation. The aim of constructive interpretation is to justify the coercion of the State. A trivial implication of this view is that officials and citizens will comply with the law because of the justification that has been advanced by judges in their exercise of constructive interpretation. Consequently, neither officials nor citizens comply with the law because they have been coerced or because they have been simply told to do (...) so. But then, it seems that constructive interpretation cannot really provide any guidance since officials and citizens have been asked toacceptthe interpretation of the law that has been put forward by the judges since arguably, it is the best possible interpretation of what the law is in this particular case. However, why they ought to do so?I will argue that the mistake of the theory of constructive interpretation lies in a misleading and implausible conception of action that believes that action is raw behavioural data and that therefore we need to ‘impose meaning’, ‘value’ or ‘purpose’ on them. I will defend a more plausible conception of action along the classical tradition that understands practice as originating in agency and deliberation. The outcome is that constructive interpretation and its conception of ‘imposing meaning’ on practice is a theoretical perspective that neglects and misunderstands action and practical reason. (shrink)